Abstract-Internet worm attacks pose a significant threat to network security and management. In this work, we coin the term Internet worm tomography as inferring the characteristics of Internet worms from the observations of Darknet or network telescopes that monitor a routable but unused IP address space. Under the framework of Internet worm tomography, we attempt to infer Internet worm temporal behaviors, i.e., the host infection time and the worm infection sequence, and thus pinpoint patient zero or initially infected hosts. Specifically, we apply statistical estimation techniques and propose method of moments, maximum likelihood, and linear regression estimators. We show analytically and empirically that our proposed estimators can better infer worm temporal characteristics than a naive estimator that has been used in the previous work. We also demonstrate that our estimators can be applied to worms using different scanning strategies such as random scanning and localized scanning.
I. INTRODUCTION

S
INCE Code Red and Nimda worms were released in 2001, epidemic-style attacks have caused severe damages. Internet worms can spread so rapidly that existing defense systems cannot respond until most vulnerable hosts have been infected. For example, on January 25th, 2003, the Slammer worm reached its maximum scanning rate of more than 55 million scans per second in about 3 min, and infected more than 90% of vulnerable machines within 10 min [1] . It cost over one billion U.S. dollars in cleanup and economic damages. Therefore, worm attacks pose a significant threat to the Internet and meanwhile present tremendous challenges to the research community.
To counteract these notorious plague-tide attacks, various detection and defense strategies have been studied in recent years. According to where the detectors are located, these strategies can generally be classified into three categories: source detection and defenses, detecting infected hosts in the local networks [2] - [5] ; middle detection and defenses, revealing the appearance of worms by analyzing the traffic going through routers [6]- [8] ; and destination detection and defenses, monitoring unwanted traffic arriving at Darknet or network telescopes, a globally routable address space where no active services or servers reside [9] - [13] . There are two types of Darknet: active Darknet that responds to malicious scans to elicit the payloads of attacks [11] , [12] and passive Darknet that observes unwanted traffic passively [10] , [13] . Different from source and middle detection and defenses, destination detection and defenses offer unique advantages in observing large-scale network explosive events such as distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks [14] and Internet worms [1] , [15] , [16] . There is no legitimate reason for packets destined to Darknet. Hence, most of the traffic arriving at Darknet is malicious or unintended, including hostile reconnaissance scans, probe activities from active worms, DDoS backscatter, and packets from misconfigured hosts. Moreover, it has been shown that for a large-scale worm event, most infected hosts, if not all, can be observed by the Darknet with a sufficiently large size [17] .
In this work, we focus on the destination detection and defenses. Specifically, we study the problem of inferring the characteristics of Internet worms from Darknet observations. We refer to such a problem as Internet worm tomography, as illustrated in Fig. 1 . Most worms use scan-based methods to find vulnerable hosts and randomly generate target IP addresses. Thus, Darknet can observe partial scans from infected hosts. Together with the worm propagation model and the statistical model, Darknet observations can be used to detect worm appearance [18] - [21] and infer worm characteristics (e.g., infection rate [22] , number of infected hosts [17] , [23] , and worm infection sequence [24] - [26] ). Internet worm tomography is named after network tomography, which infers the characteristics of the internal network (e.g., link loss rate, link delay, and topology) through the observations from end systems [27] , [28] . Network tomography can be formulated as a linear inverse problem. Internet worm tomography, however, cannot be translated into the linear inverse problem due to the specific properties of worm propagation, and thus presents new challenges.
Under the framework of Internet worm tomography, researchers have studied worm temporal characteristics and attempted to answer the following important questions: 1) Host infection time: When exactly does a specific host get infected? This information is critical for the reconstruction of the worm infection sequence [25] . 2) Worm infection sequence: What is the order in which hosts are infected by worm propagation? Such an order can help identify patient zero or initially infected hosts [24] . The information of both the infection time and the infection sequence is important for defending against worms. First, the identification of patient zero or initially infected hosts and their infection times provides forensic clues for law enforcement against the attackers who wrote and spread the worm. Second, the knowledge of the infection sequence provides insights into how a worm spread across the Internet (e.g., characteristics on who infected whom) and how network defense systems were breached.
A simple estimator has been proposed in [25] to infer worm temporal behaviors. The estimator uses the observation time when an infected host scans the Darknet for the first time as the approximation of the host infection time to infer the worm infection sequence. Such a naive estimator (NE), however, does not fully exploit all information obtained by the Darknet. Moreover, an attacker can design a smart worm that uses lower scanning rates for patient zero or initially infected hosts and higher scanning rates for other infected hosts. In this way, the smart worm would weaken the performance of the NE.
The goal of this paper is to infer the Internet worm temporal characteristics accurately by exploiting Darknet observations and applying statistical estimation techniques. Our research work makes several contributions: 1) We propose method of moments, maximum likelihood, and linear regression statistical estimators to infer the host infection time. We show analytically and empirically that the mean squared error (MSE) of our proposed estimators can be almost half of that of the NE in inferring the host infection time. We also demonstrate the optimality of our proposed estimators through the Cramer-Rao bound. 2) We extend our proposed estimators to infer the worm infection sequence. Specifically, we formulate the problem of estimating the worm infection sequence as a detection problem and derive the probability of error detection for different estimators. We demonstrate analytically and empirically that our method performs much better than the algorithm proposed in [25] . Specifically, we show that our estimators achieve better performance through both simulations and real-world worm trace analysis. 3) We show empirically that our estimators have a better performance in identifying patient zero or initially infected hosts of the smart worm than the NE. We also demonstrate that our estimators can be applied to worms using different scanning strategies such as random scanning and localized scanning (LS). In this paper, we apply existing techniques in statistics (such as the maximum likelihood estimator and the Cramer-Rao lower bound) to the problem of worm detection and inference, which is important to network security and management. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first attempt in applying advanced estimation methods to infer the worm infection time and the worm infection sequence and to identify patient zero or initially infected hosts.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces estimators for inferring the host infection time. Section III presents our algorithms in estimating the worm infection sequence. Section IV gives simulation results. Finally, Section V concludes the paper.
II. ESTIMATING THE HOST INFECTION TIME
We apply Darknet observations to estimate when a host gets infected and use hit to denote the event that a worm scan hits the Darknet. As shown in Fig. 2 , suppose that a certain host is infected at time . The Darknet monitors a portion of the IPv4 address space and can observe some scans from this host and record hit times , where is the number of hit events from this host. The problem of estimating the host infection time can then be stated as follows: Given the Darknet observations , what is the best estimate of ? To study this problem analytically, we make the following assumptions: 1) There is no packet loss in the Internet. In Section IV-D, however, we relax this assumption and use simulations to study the effect of packet losses on different estimators. 2) An infected host uses its actual source IP address and does not apply IP spoofing, which is the case for TCP worms.
3) The scanning rate (i.e., the number of scans sent by an infected host per time unit) is time-invariant for an infected host, whereas the scanning rates of infected hosts can be different from each other. The last assumption comes from the observation that famous worms, such as Code Red, Nimda, Slammer, and Witty, do not apply any scanning rate variation mechanisms. An infected host always scans for vulnerable hosts at the maximum speed allowed by its computing resources and network conditions [29] .
Obviously, inferring from Darknet observations is affected by Internet-worm scanning methods. In this paper, we focus on random scanning and LS. However, our estimation techniques can be applied to other worm-scanning methods, such as importance scanning [30] , for which a scan from an infected host hits Darknet with a time-invariant probability. To analytically estimate the host infection time, we consider a discrete-time system. For random scanning (RS), a worm selects targets randomly and scans the entire IPv4 address space with addresses (i.e.,
). We assume that Darknet monitors addresses. Thus, the probability for a scan to hit the Darknet is ; and the probability of a hit event in the discrete-time system (i.e., the probability that Darknet observes at least one scan from the same infected host in a time unit) is (1) Since is time-invariant for a given infected host, is also time-invariant. LS preferentially searches for vulnerable hosts in the "local" address space [31] . For simplicity, in this paper, we only consider the LS:
of the time, a "local" IP address with the same first bits as the attacking host is chosen as the target;
of the time, a random address is chosen. We consider a centralized Darknet that occupies a continuous address space and monitors addresses. Moreover, we assume that the Darknet is contained in a prefix with no vulnerable hosts. For example, network telescopes used by CAIDA are such a centralized Darknet and contain a /8 subnet. Since no infected hosts exist in the subnet where the Darknet resides, the probability for a worm scan to hit the Darknet is . Therefore, the probability of a hit event in the discrete-time system is (2) which is time-invariant. Since has a similar form as and is the special case of when , we use to denote the hit probability in general for both cases to simplify our discussion.
Denote as the time interval between when a host gets infected and when Darknet observes the first scan from this host, i.e., , as shown in Fig. 2 . Denote as the time interval between the th hit and the th hit on Darknet, i.e., , . Thus, are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) and follow a geometric distribution with parameter , i.e., (3) (4) Denote as the mean value of and as the estimate of . We then estimate by subtracting from , i.e., (5) Therefore, our problem is reduced to estimating . Table I summarizes the notations used in this paper.
A. Naive Estimator (NE)
Since follows the geometric distribution as described by (3), is maximized when . Then, an NE of is (6) Thus, the NE of is (7) Note that depends only on , but not on . This estimator has been used in [25] to infer the host infection time and the worm infection sequence. In this paper, however, we consider more advanced estimation methods. 
B. Method of Moments Estimator
Since , we design a method of moments estimator (MME), i.e., (8) Thus, the MME of is (9) Note that is not only related to , but also to and .
C. Maximum Likelihood Estimator
Rewrite the probability mass function of in (3) with respect to (10) Since are i.i.d., the likelihood function is given by the following product:
We then design a maximum likelihood estimator (MLE), i.e.,
Rather than maximizing , we choose to maximize its logarithm . That is,
which has the same expression as the MME. Thus,
D. Linear Regression Estimator
Under the assumption that the scanning rate of an individual infected host is time-invariant, the relationship between and can be described by a linear regression model (16) where and are coefficients, and is the error term. To fit the observation data, we apply the least squares method to adjust the parameters of the model. That is, we choose the coefficients that minimize the residual sum of squares (RSS)
Setting the partial derivatives of the RSS with respect to the coefficients to zero, we then obtain (18) where the bar symbols denote the average values (19) We then design a linear regression estimator (LRE), i.e.,
Thus, the LRE of is (21)
E. Comparison of Estimators
To compare the performance of the NE and our proposed estimators, we compute the bias, the variance, and the MSE. For estimating (22) Here, the bias denotes the average deviation of the estimator from the true value; the variance indicates the distance between the estimator and its mean; and the MSE characterizes the closeness of the estimated value to the true value. A smaller MSE indicates a better estimator. Table II summarizes the results of NE, MME (or MLE), and LRE for estimating . The details of the derivations of Table II are given in Appendix A. It is noted that MME and LRE are unbiased, while NE is biased. Moreover, MME and LRE have a smaller MSE than NE if and , a condition that is usually satisfied. Specifically, when , and , but . It is also observed that MME is slightly better than LRE in terms of MSE when . (23) i.e., the MSE of our proposed estimators is almost half of that of the NE. That is, our proposed estimators are nearly twice as accurate as the NE in estimating the host infection time.
F. Optimality of MME or MLE
We apply the Cramer-Rao lower bound [32] to show that MME (or MLE) is indeed optimal in estimating . From (11) (24) for all . Then, the Cramer-Rao lower bound of is (25) Since the MSE of MME (and MLE) is equal to the Cramer-Rao lower bound of , MME (or MLE) is optimal in estimating .
III. ESTIMATING THE WORM INFECTION SEQUENCE
In this section, we extend our proposed estimators for inferring the worm infection sequence.
A. Algorithm
Our algorithm is that we first estimate the infection time of each infected host. Then, we reconstruct the infection sequence based on these infection times. That is, if , we infer that host is infected before host . It is noted that the algorithm used in [25] to infer the worm infection sequence can be regarded as using this approach with the NE.
The NE, however, can potentially fail to infer the worm infection sequence in some cases. Fig. 3 shows an example, where hosts and get infected at and , respectively, and . Moreover, these two infected hosts have scanning rates such that Darknet observes . If the NE is used, , which means that host is incorrectly inferred to be infected after host . Intuitively, if our proposed estimators are applied, it is possible to obtain and thus recover the real infection sequence. 
B. Performance Analysis
To analytically show that our estimators are more accurate than the NE in estimating the worm infection sequence, we formulate the problem as a detection problem. Specifically, in Fig. 3 , suppose that host is infected after host (i.e.,
). If , we call it "success" detection; otherwise, if , we call it "error" detection. 1 We attempt to calculate the probability of error detection for different estimators.
Note that and follow the geometric distribution [i.e., (3)] with parameter and , respectively. Here, (or ) is the probability that at least one scan from host (or ) hits the Darknet in a time unit and follows (1) for random scanning and (2) 
where or . To calculate the probability of error detection for different estimators, we define a new random variable (27) Set . Since and are independent, the probability density function (pdf) can be calculated through the convolution of and . Hence, we can obtain .
1) Naive Estimator (NE):
The NE uses to estimate . Thus, the probability of error detection is (29) where , the time interval between the infection of host and host ; and . We then have (30) 1 We ignore the case here.
Note that another way to derive is based on the memoryless property of the exponential distribution and , i.e.,
which leads to the same result.
2) Proposed Estimators:
We assume that Darknet observes a sufficient number of scans from hosts and so that our proposed estimators can estimate (i.e., ) and (i.e., ) accurately. Then, the probability of error detection of our proposed estimators is (32) When ,
When ,
3) Performance Comparison: Since and , for a given , comparing (30) with (33) and (34) .
Hence, it is unclear which estimator is better based on the expressions of and . However, we 
can compare the performance of our estimators with the NE through numerical analysis. We first demonstrate the probabilities of error detection (i.e., and ) as the functions of and in Fig. 4(a) and (b) , where . It can be seen that for the NE, when host hits the Darknet with a very low probability, is almost 1 regardless of . However, the worst case of is slightly above 0.6 when is small. Moreover, we show the probabilities of error detection as a function of with a given pair of and in Fig. 4 (c) and (d). The performance of two estimators improves as increases. Furthermore, the sum of the integral of the two figures is 41.43, while the sum of the integral in these two cases is only 34.76. This shows that the improvement gain of our estimators over the NE when outweighs the degradation suffered when , indicating the benefits of applying our estimators. Note that , , and can be random variables. To evaluate the overall performance of each estimator, we consider the average probability of error detection over , , and , i.e., (36) Since , , and are independent,
We then consider some cases in which we are interested and apply the numerical integration toolbox in Matlab [34] to calculate the triple integration. For example, we assume that and follow a normal distribution and is uniform over . We find that when , , and are set to realistic values, we always have (38) That is, our proposed estimators perform better than NE on average, which will be further verified in Section IV through simulations.
Moreover, in Fig. 4(a) , it can be seen that the majority of detection error for the NE comes from the case that . Specifically, it is obvious to derive the following theorem from (30) and (33) .
That is, the error probability is decreased by a factor of by applying our estimators as compared with the NE.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we use simulations to verify our analytical results, i.e., compare estimators in inferring the host infection time and the worm infection sequence and in identifying the patient zero or the hit list, and to study the effect of packet losses on different estimators. We then apply a real-world worm trace to compare the performance of our proposed estimators and the NE.
A. Estimating the Host Infection Time
We evaluate the performance of estimators in estimating the host infection time through simulations. For the case of randomscanning worms, we simulate the behavior of a host infected by the Code Red v2 worm. The host is infected at time tick 0 and uses a constant scanning rate. The time unit is set to 20 s. The Darknet records hit times during an observation window. The results are averaged over 100 independent runs. Fig. 5 compares the performance (i.e., MSE of estimators for ) of NE, MME, and LRE. In our simulations, we use a Darknet size of , a scanning rate of 358 scans/min, and an observation window size of 800 min as default values. Moreover, when a parameter is studied and varied, we keep other parameters unchanged. Specifically, we consider the effects of the Darknet size, the scanning rate, and the observation window size on the performance of the estimators. It is observed that for all cases, our proposed estimators have a better performance (i.e., smaller MSE) than the NE in estimating the host infection time. Specifically, the simulation results verify Theorem 1, i.e., that the MSE of our estimators is almost half of that of the NE, when the observation window size is sufficiently large (e.g., 200 min).
Next, we study a host infected by localized-scanning worms and adopt the same simulation parameters and settings as the above. The main difference is that here the host preferentially searches for vulnerable hosts in the "local" address space with a probability . In Fig. 6 , we compare for different estimators. The default parameter values are a Darknet size of , a scanning rate of 358 scans/min, an observation window size of 800 min, and a value of 0.7. We find that the results are similar to those for the random-scanning case shown in Fig. 5 . That is, the MSE of our estimators is almost half of that of the NE. On the other hand, it can be seen that the in Fig. 6(a)-(c) is larger for all cases than that in Fig. 5 since the localized-scanning worm hits the Darknet less frequently than the random-scanning worm.
B. Estimating the Worm Infection Sequence
We simulate the propagation of the Code Red v2 worm and evaluate the performance of our algorithms in estimating the worm infection sequence. The simulator is extended from the code provided by [35] , where the parameter setting is based on the Code Red worm characteristics. The Code Red worm has a vulnerable population of 360 000. Different infected hosts may have different scanning rates. Thus, we assign a scanning rate (scans/min) from a normal distribution to a newly infected host. Moreover, we start our simulation at time tick 0 from one infected host. The time unit is set to 20 s. Detailed information about how the parameters are chosen can be found in [22, Sec. VII] . Each point in Fig. 7 is averaged over 20 independent runs.
To compare the performance of estimators quantitatively, we consider a simple sequence distance, i.e., (40) where is the length of the infection sequence considered, is the actual infection sequence (i.e., ), and is the estimated sequence. Note that the smaller the sequence distance is, the better the estimator performance will be. Fig. 7 compares the performance of different estimators for random-scanning worms, where the default parameter values are a Darknet size of , a scanning rate standard deviation of 115, an observation window size of 1600 min, and a length of the infection sequence considered of 1000. Specifically, Fig. 7(a) shows the sequence distances of NE, MME, and LRE with varying Darknet sizes from to . It is observed that when the Darknet size increases, the performance of all estimators improves dramatically. Moreover, the performance of MME and LRE is always better than that of NE. For example, when the Darknet size equals , MME and LRE improve the inference accuracy by 24%, compared with NE. Fig. 7(b) demonstrates the sequence distances of these three estimators by changing the standard deviation of the scanning rate (i.e., ) from 100 to 125. It is noted that when increases, the performance of all estimators deteriorates. The performance of MME and LRE, however, is always better than that of NE. For example, when , MME and LRE reduce the sequence distance by 30%, compared with NE. In Fig. 7(c) , we increase the length of the infection sequence considered from 1000 to 11 000. It is intuitive that the sequence distances of all estimators become larger as increases. However, MME and LRE are always better than NE.
Next, we extend our simulator to imitate the spread of localized-scanning worms. Specifically, we consider /8 localizedscanning worms and a centralized /8 Darknet with IP addresses. We still use the Code Red v2 worm parameters and the same setting as random scanning, except that the observation window size is 1000 min (this is because localized-scanning worms spread faster). The distribution of vulnerable hosts is extracted from the dataset provided by DShield [36] . DShield obtains the information of vulnerable hosts by aggregating logs from more than 1600 intrusion detection systems distributed throughout the Internet. Specifically, we use the dataset with port 80 (HTTP) that is exploited by the Code Red v2 worm to generate the vulnerable-hosts distribution. Each point in Fig. 8 is averaged over 20 independent runs. Fig. 8 compares the sequence distances of different estimators for localized-scanning worms. Specifically, the results in Fig. 8(a) and (b) are similar to those in Fig. 7(b) and (c). In Fig. 8(c) , we compare the performance of the estimators by increasing from 0 to 0.7. Here, and . It is observed that the sequence distances of all estimators increase as becomes larger. However, our estimators are always better than NE. For example, when , MME and LRE increase the inference accuracy by 27%, compared with NE. Therefore, our proposed estimators perform much better than the NE for both random-scanning and localized-scanning worms in estimating the worm infection sequence.
C. Identifying the Patient Zero or the Hit List
As discussed in Section I, a smart worm can assign lower scanning rates to the initially infected host(s) and higher scanning rates to other infected hosts. In this way, the Darknet might observe later infected hosts first, and therefore, the smart worm would weaken the performance of the NE. In Fig. 9 , we compare the performance of estimators in identifying the hit list of such a smart worm. Specifically, the worm assigns scanning rates from to the host(s) on the hit list and scanning rates from to other infected hosts. Then, we calculate the percentage of the host(s) on the hit list that are successfully identified by an estimator. For example, if the size of the hit list is 100 and 50 hosts that belong to the hit list are identified among the first 100 hosts of the estimated infection sequence, the successful identification percentage of the estimator is 50%. The results are averaged over 100 independent runs. Fig. 9(a) shows the case of random scanning, where the Darkent size is and the observation window size is 1000 min. It is seen that our estimators have a higher successful identification percentage and a smaller variance than the NE. For instance, when the size of the hit list is 1 (i.e., the worm starts from the patient zero), MME and LRE can pinpoint the patient zero around 80% of the time, while NE can detect it only 70% of the time. When the size of the hit list is 10 or 100, compared with NE, our proposed estimators increase the number of successfully identified hosts from 5 to 7 or 51 to 72, and reduce the variance from 2.6 to 1.6 or 23 to 13, respectively. Fig. 9(b) shows the results of LS, where the Darkent size is , , and all other parameters are the same as the case of random scanning. The results are similar to those in Fig. 9(a) . Therefore, the simulation results demonstrate that our proposed estimators are much more effective in identifying the histlist of the smart worm than the NE.
D. Simulating Packet Losses
In our analysis, we assume that there is no packet loss, which might not be true in the real Internet. A packet towards Darknet may be lost due to various reasons such as congestion caused by the worm (such as the Slammer worm [1] ) or the malfunction of Darknet monitoring devices. To study the effects of packet losses, we modify our simulator to incorporate the case when . Performance comparison of the sequence distance of NE, MME, and LRE for random-scanning worms when packets can be lost. The parameter values are a Darknet size of IP addresses, scanning rates from , an observation window size of 1600 min, and a length of the infection sequence considered of 1000. packets can be lost and then evaluate the performance of different estimators. Specifically, we assume that the loss rate of the worm packets towards Darknet (denoted as ) is the same for each infected host. Fig. 10 shows how the sequence distances of different estimators vary with the worm packet loss rate for random-scanning worms, where the Darknet size is IP addresses, scanning rates are from , the observation window size is 1600 min, and . The results are averaged over 20 independent runs. It is intuitive that when the packet loss rate becomes larger, the performance of all estimators worsens. Our proposed estimators, however, always perform much better than NE. For example, compared with NE, our estimators (i.e., MME and LRE) improve the inference accuracy by 28% when . Therefore, our proposed estimators are still superior to the NE when the condition that there is no packet loss does not hold.
E. Analyzing a Real-World Worm Trace
In this section, we attempt to apply a real-world worm trace to compare our proposed estimators with the NE. The worm trace we use is from CAIDA and is the propagation of the Witty worm observed by /8 UCSD network telescopes [37] . Such a worm trace contains the first 45 min of Witty worm traffic 2 monitored by the Darknet. Specifically, we use the order in which infected hosts are observed at the /8 network telescopes as the actual worm infection sequence (i.e., the ground truth). When applying this worm trace, we notice two factors that may affect the comparisons of estimators: 1) The /8 Darknet observations might not faithfully reflect the ground truth, which impacts the performance of all estimators. 2) Since only the first 45 min of worm traffic are studied, the number of hits from an infected hosts is limited, which impacts our designed estimators. Although these undesirable factors exist, this worm trace is the best publicly available dataset to approximate the actual worm infection sequence.
We then apply estimators to observations from /16 and /20 subnets of network telescopes. We evaluate the performance of an estimator by comparing the infection sequence observed from the /8 network telescopes (i.e., the ground truth) with the infection sequence estimated from the /16 (or /20) subnet (i.e., the estimation results). The results of the sequence distance of NE and MME (or MLE) are shown in Table IV . Here, we apply the estimators to the subnets that observed the largest number of unique source IP addresses, i.e., 0.179.0.0/16 and 0.85.80.0/20, respectively. Moreover, we only consider hosts that hit the subnets 20 times or more for our designed estimators and NE. It can be seen that although such real-world trace analysis contains undesirable factors, our proposed estimators (i.e., MME or MLE) still work better than NE in estimating the real worm infection sequence. For example, if subnet 0.179.0.0/16 is studied, MME (or MLE) improves the estimation accuracy by 6.9%, compared with NE.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have attempted to estimate the temporal characteristics of Internet worms through both analysis and simulation under the framework of Internet worm tomography. Specifically, we have proposed method of moments, maximum likelihood, and linear regression estimators to infer the host infection time and reconstruct the worm infection sequence. We have shown analytically and empirically that the MSE of our proposed estimators can be almost half of that of the NE in estimating the host infection time. Moreover, we have formulated the problem of estimating the worm infection sequence as a detection problem and calculated the probability of error detection for different estimators. We have demonstrated empirically that our estimation methods perform much better than the algorithm from [25] in estimating the worm infection sequence and in identifying the hit list for both random-scanning and localized-scanning worms.
A detailed discussion on the limitations and the extensions of our proposed estimators can be found in [38] . As part of our ongoing work, we plan to extend our estimators to incorporate more Internet worm dynamics and characteristics, such as congestion caused by worms and the spatial dependence of worm propagation.
APPENDIX A TABLE II: ESTIMATOR PROPERTIES
We calculate the bias, the variance, and the MSE of different estimators for estimating .
A. Naive Estimator (NE)
Since , the bias of NE is
Note that is constant. Thus, the variance of NE is
Therefore,
B. MME/MLE
Since for and (8) and (14) hold, the bias of (or ) is calculated as (44) which is unbiased. Note that for and 's are independent. Thus, we have (45) Therefore, the MSE of (or ) is (46) It is noted that for an unbiased estimator, the MSE is identical to its variance.
C. Linear Regression Estimator
Note that . From (19) 
A. Naive Estimator (NE)
Since , , and
Note that when , .
B. MME/MLE
Note that and . Thus, (58) (59)
Since that is independent of (60) based on (45) and . Note that when , .
C. Linear Regression Estimator
Since and (61)
Note that from (49) and (50), that is independent of . Hence,
based on (54) and . Note that when , .
